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High Court of Justce, Queen'8 Bench Division.
JOLLIFFE v. BAKER.
After a purchaser has taken a conveyance and paid the purchase-money no action
can be maintained either at law or in equity, for damages or compensation on account of errors as to the quantity or quality of the subject-matter of the sale, unless
such error amount to a breach of some contract or warranty contained in the conveyance itself or unless some fraud and deceit has been practised upon the purchaser.
The fraud which will entitle the purchaser to compensation is actual fraud. The
mere description of the land as containing a larger quantity than appears upon subsequent measurement is not in itself such fraud.,
Where land is described as "containing by estimation three acres or thereabouts"
and it appears that the vendor himself purchased it by this description and believed
it to contain that quantity, but in fact it only contained two acres, one rood and
twelve perches, there is no breach of any warranty and the purchaser is not entitled
to compensation.
Hart v. Swaine, 7 Ch. Div. 42, and In re Turner and Skelton, 13 Id. 130, disapproved.
APPEAL from the decision of the judge of the Hampshire,
County Court.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
WATKIN WILLIAMS, J.-The -question arises between vendor
and purchaser of real property; the plaintiff, the purchaser, seeking to recover compensation from the defendant, the vendor, after
the completion of the contract, on account of an alleged mis-statement as to the acreage of the property, made in the contract of sale
and repeated in the conveyance, but made in good faith and without
any intention to deceive.
The appeal comes before us on a special case stated by the judge,
from which the facts appear to be as follows:In June 1881, the defendant advertised the property in question
for sale, and, in reply to a letter of inquiry from the plaintiff, thus
described it in a letter of the 1st of July 1881 :"The property is situate at Stroud Wood; it consists of cottage,
thatched, with four rooms, pigstye, cow-pen, garden and capital
meadow, in all three acres; it has been occupied by Charles Lee
for the past thirty years, and the rental is 161. a year. Price,
2751."
The plaintiff went and looked at the property, but it was never
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measured, and, on July 28th 1881, a contract in writing was
entered into betwpen the parties for the purchase at 2701. ; in this
contract the property was described as "All that freehold cottage
or tenement, garden and land, containing, by estimation, three
acres or thereabouts."
There were provisions for delivery of
abstract of title, and 'making requisitions and objections, as follows : "The purchaser shall make his objections and requisitions
(if any) in respect of the title and all matters appearing upon the
abstract, or these presents, and send the same within fourteen
days from the date of delivery of the abstract, and, in default of
such objections and requisitions, and subject to such, shall be
deemed to have accepted the title and to have waived all other
objections and requisitions, and, if he shall insist on any objection
which the vendor shall be unable or unwilling to remove or comply
with, the vendor may, by notice in writing to be given to the purchaser, at any time, and, notwithstanding any negotiation or
litigation in respect of such objection, annul the sale, and the
purchaser shall have no claim on the vendor for the expense of
investigating the title, or other expenses whatsoever, or for compensation."
The purchase was completed and the conveyance executed on
August 25th 1881, and the purchase-money was paid and possession taken on the same day. In the conveyance the property was
described as, "All that cottage or tenement and piece or parcel
of meadow land to the same adjoining, containing, by estimation,
one and a half acres, more or less, bounded on lands now or late of
Dame Jane St. John Mildmay on the north part, and upon Stroud
Wood on the east, south and west, and also all thAt piece or parcel
of land, containing, by estimation, one and a half acres, more
or less, sometime since purchased of the (Inclosure) Commissioners, adjoining to and now thrown with the said piece of
meadow land."
The defendant had purchased the property in 1879 by the same
description in every respect; he had never measured the land,
and believed that the description as to acreage was correct, and he
sold the property to the plaintiff in good faith, honestly believing
the estimate to be correct.
In December 1881, the plaintiff, in consequence of statements
that had been made to him, measured the land and found that it
contained 2a. Ir. 1 2p., instead of about three acres, and he applied
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to the defendant for compensation.
The defendant refused to
make compensation, and this action was brought to recover it.
The county court judge found that there was no fraud or deceit on
the part of the defendant, but decided that, notwithstanding there
was no fraud, yet, as the actual quantity of land did not sufficiently answer the description in the contract and conveyance,
the plaintiff was entitled to recover for the deficiency in quantity,
and gave judgment for the plaintiff for 501.
From this decision the defendant has appealed, and we have to
determine whether it is correct.
Before considering the legal questions involved in the case, I
will turn again for one moment to the facts. The land, the subject-matter of the sale, consisted of specific parcels defined by
metes and bounds, and there was no mistake or error as to the
extent of the parcels of land sold, which were seen and examined
by the purchaser before the sale; the purchase-money was an
entire lump sum for the lot; the vendor undoubtedly represented
the property in the treaty for the sale as being, in all, three acres,
and in the formal contract, and in the conveyance itself, it is
described as " containing, by estimation, three acres, or thereabouts."
It was stated that the county court judge, in the decision at which
he arrived, acted upon and followed the undoubtedly high authority
of two opinions recently expressed by FRY, L. J., in Rart v.
Swaine, 7 Oh. D. 42, and Sir GEORGE JESSEL, in In re Turner
i and Skelton, 13 Oh. . 130, which are said to have laid down the
proposition broadly that a purchaser, even after completion and
after conveyance, and in the absence of actual fraud, was entitled
to claim compensation for errors and inaccuracies in the particulars
of the land sold, and it was strenuously argued before us that,
although the county court judge had negatived actual moral fraud,
yet that the case was one coming within the principle of legal
fraud, entitling the purchaser to relief even after conveyance.
In direct opposition to these were cited three decisions of
MALINS, V. C., in the last of which he distinctly disputed the
correctness of Sir GEORGE JESSEL'S decision, and declined to
follow it, and it is in this conflict of the most recent authorities
that we have to determine the question.
I propose at once to examine the conflicting authorities that
have been cited to us. The first in order of date is tart v.
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Swaine, decided in 1877. It was an action by the purchaser
against the vendor of real estate, to set aside, after conveyance,
the sale of a piece of land sold as freehold, which afterwards was
discovered to be copyhold. The defendant sold the land in ques.tion, about four acres, to the plaintiff in February 1876, and conveyed it.to him as freehold. It appeared that the defendant had
bought, the land, together with other land, in 1871, from one
Chamberlain, who informed him that a portion of the land he was
selling was copyhold. In fact the copyhold portion had been an
allotment .under an Inclosure Act in respect of other copyhold
lands the property of the Chamberlains, and there was nothing in
the abstract of title showing that any of the land offered for sale
was copyhold, and the defendant, for his own convenience, took a
conveyance of the whole from Chamberlain as freehold. It appeared also,. that early in 1876, and before the defendant sold to the
plaintiff, the defendant had put up the four acres for sale by public
auction, and on that occasion a Mr. Smith, publicly stated in the
auction-room, that the land was copyhold, and not freehold, and
no sale was then effected. From this statement I collect that the
defendant had then proposed to sell the property as freehold, when
Mr. Smith stated that it was copyhold, and that he afterwards,
within a month; sold the property to the plaintiff, asserting it to
be, and selling it as, freehold. FRY, L. J., set aside the sale, and
ordered the defendant to repay the. purchase-money with interest
and -expenses. The decision, if I may say so without appearing
impertinent, is equally consistent with sound law as with sound
sense, but the reasoning upon which it is founded is, if I may say
so without presumption, unsatisfactory, and has proved misleading.
At the conclusion of the case, FRY, L. J., said: "I see no evidence of actual fraud on the part of the defendant; he has only
made a mistake. But as he has taken upon himself to assert that
the land is freehold, am I at liberty to look into the state of his
mind?" And further on he says: "The defendant took upon
himself to assert that to be true which has turned out to be false,
and he made this assertion for the purpose of benefiting himself.
Though he may have done this, believing it to be true, the result
appears to me to be that which is expressed in the judgment of
I4AULE, J., in .Evans v. Edmonds, 13 0. B. 777, where he says,
' I conceive if a man having no knowledge whatever upon the
subject, takes upon himself to represent a certain state of facts to
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exist, he does so at his peril; and if it be done either with a view
to secure some benefit to himself, or to deceive a third person, le
is in law guilty of a fraud, for he takes upon himself to warrant
his own belief of the truth of that which he so asserts. Although
the person making the representation may have no knowledge of
its falsehood, the representation may still have been fraudulently
made'-that is to say," continues FnY, L. J., "the defendant
having taken upon himself, with a view to securing a benefit to
himself, to assert that the property was freehold, has, in the view
of a court of law, committed a fraud." Having further cited the
case of Rawlins v. Wickham, 3 Do G. & J. 316, he concluded by
saying, "It appears to me, therefore, that in this case there
has been a legal fraud committed by the defendant, and that I
am bound by the authorities to give the plaintiffs the relief they
ask."
In the first place, it seems, looking to the facts of Hart v.
Swaine, supra, that it can scarcely be cited as an authority in
support of the doctrine that the so-called legal fraud, without
actual moral fraud, is a sufficient ground for setting aside a conveyance. There was in that case ample evidence of fraud in the
common meaning of the term. The defendant, even if he did not
know his statement to be false, could not possibly have known it
to be true in the sense that, 8ecundum sujectam materiem, the,
plaintiff had a right to suppose from his statements that he did
know it; and it is certainly unfortunate that the language of
MAULE, J., in Evans v. Edmonds, 8upra, should have been cited
as an authority for the proposition that there can be an actionable
legal fraud in the absence of moral fraud, because Evans v. Edmonds, supra, was a case of the most flagrant fraud and treachery
to be found in our books. In that case the plaintiff, as trustee
under a separation deed between the defendant and his wife, sued
for arrears of an annuity which the defendant had covenanted to
pay. The defendant, in a plea very inartificially drawn, pleaded
that he was induced to enter into the deed by false and fraudulent
misrepresentation of the plaintiff, to the effect that the wife was a
chaste person, and that he (the plaintiff) was a virtuous person,
and fit to be a trustee, whereas the plaintiff had treacherously and
perfidiously seduced the wife and concealed the fact from the
defendant, and fraudulently induced the defendant to enter into
the separation deed in order that he might seduce away the wife
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and keep up his adulterous intercourse with her. At the trial the
jury found the p!ea to be true, and gave their verdict for the
defendant. The plaintiff then moved for judgment non obstante
veredicto, upon the ground that the plea was bad, having omitted
the necessary averment of the plaintiff's knowledge at the time of
making the representation that the wife was unchaste. The only
point was whether the omission of this technical averment was
cured and supplemented by the verdict, inasmuch as actual fraud
in fact was necessarily involved in the finding of the jury. The
objection after verdict was obviously frivolous and absurd, and the
observations of MAULE, J., in answering it, were conceived in a
vein of the keenest irony and satire when he said that a person
might make such a representation fraudulently, as the jury had
found, consistently with his not knowing it at the time.to be false,
which was not averred.
Nor is the other case cited by FRY, L. J.,-namely, Rawlins v.
Wicrkham, supra,-any better authority for this doctrine of legal
as distinguished from moral fraud. In that case the plaintiff had
entered into 'partnership with two persons named Bailey and Wickham, as bankers, and paid 23001. for his share, upon the faith of a
statement of accounts and balance-sheet handed to him by both of
them, showing the bank to be in a solvent condition; the plaintiff
discovering afterwards that the accounts and balance-sheet were
false, brought an action at law against them both for damages for
false' and fraudulent misrepresentation. During the pendency of
this action Wickham died. The plaintiff proceeded with his action
against Bailey, and recovered damages amounting to about 12,0001.;
failing to obtain satisfaction from Bailey, he filed his bill against
Wickham's executors and Bailey for a dissolution of the partnership, and claimed a return of his 23001. and an indemnity.. There
was strong ground for believing that Wickham had no knowledge
that the accounts were false, and this was urged as a ground why
his estate should not be made responsible. A decree, however,
was made dissolving the partnership, and directing the money to
be repaid out of Wickham's estate, TURNER, L. J., saying, "AA
representation was *made by Wickham of a fact of the truth or
falsehood of which he knew nothing. It has turned out that this
representation was contrary to the fact. There was not, as I
think, any moral fraud, but there was legal fraud, and the result is
that the estate of Mr. Wickham must answer for the fraud."
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Whatever may have been the language of the judgment, I venture,
with great deference, to say that the decision rests, and may be
supported upon the sound, broad foundation of the well-known
principle of law, that every partner undertakes and engages for
the fidelity of his co-partners in the execution of matters within
the scope of the authority conferred upon them; and all that
could be decided in that case was that Wickham, even though an
innocent partner, could not escape from the consequences of the
fraudulent misrepresentation of his partner in a transaction which
he hbad authorized him to carry out, and there was no necessity to
resort to any doctrine of fraud.
The next in order of the alleged conflicting authorities were two
decisions of MALINS, V. C., in which he decided that in the
absence of fraud a purchaser cannot obtain compensation after
conveyance for misrepresentation, even though such misrepresentation related to the subject-matter of the conveyance.
The first of these cases was Manson v. Thacker, 7 Ch. D. 620.
It was an application by a purchaser of real property, known as
Norway Wharf, for cu, pensation in respect of an underground
culvert not disclosed by the particulars of sale, wherein the property was described as "available" as a building site for a: warehouse, and by the sixteenth condition of which it was provided
"that, if any error or mis-statement should appear to have been
made in the particulars, such error or mis-statement was not to
annul the sale, or to entitle the purchaser to be discharged from
his purchase, but compensation was to be made to or by the purchaser as the case might be, and the amount was to be settled by a
judge at Chambers."." The contract was completed, and the conveyance executed, in February 1877, and in July following, the
purchaser discovered a culvert running underneath the land, and
that he had no right to interfere with it. The mouth of the culvert was visible at low water. The vice-chancellor, assuming that
the purchaser would have been entitled to compensation if he bad
come before completion, held that, after the conveyance had been
executed, and the purchase-money paid and possession taken, he
was not entitled to compensation. He declined to follow the case
of Bos v. Helsham, L. R., 2 Ex. 72, which I shall refer to hereafter, where the Court of Exchequer held that such a clause entitled the purchaser to compensation after the completion of the
purchase, and he considered that in Hart v. Swaine, supra, the
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whole contract was vitiated by what he called legal fraud, by
which, however, I understand him to have meant that which would
have been treated as a fraud even in a court of law.
The second case was Besley v. Besley, 9 Ch. D. 103. That
was an action for the administration of the estate of one Besley, a
type-founder, and a claim was made upon the estate under the following circumstances: In 1861 Besley sold his business to the
claimants for 10,0001., and, amongst other things, it was agreed
that Besley should grant them an underlease of the premises for
the residue of the term for which he held the same, except the
last two days, at 2251. a year; the purchase was completed, and
by an underlease prepared by Besley's solicitor the premises were
demised for twenty-three years less ten days. It was afterwards
discovered that the term had only sixteen years to run instead
of twenty-three, and that Besley bad consequently granted the
lease for seven years longer than he had power to do, and the
claimants were obliged, at the end of sixteen years, to pay a rent
of 4001. a year. It was admitted that this was done by mistake.
The vice-chancellor decided that the claim was inadmissible, stating
that a purchaser must be wise in time, and is bound to look into
the facts connected with the subject-matter of his purchase before
completion of the contract, and that after the execution of the conveyance, in the absence of fraud, he comes too late.
I next come to the undoubted good authority of Sir GEORGE
JESSEL on the other side, in the case of In re Turner and
Skelton, supra, which was an application under the Vendors' and
Purchasers' Act 1874, on the part of a purchaser seeking compensation from the vepdor, for an error as to the quantity of the
land, not discovered until after the conveyance had been executed.
The facts were these: By the contract the vendors agreed to sell,
and the purchaser to buy, a piece of land described in a schedule
as containing 6a. 2 r. 10p., or thereabouts, for 6001., and, by the
conditions of sale, it was provided that if any error or mis-statement should be found in the schedule, it should not annul the sale,
but compensation should be made in respect thereof. After the
completion of the purchase and execution of the conveyance, the
purchaser discovered, by measurement of the piece of land, that it
only contained 5a. Or. 7p. Sir GEORGE JESSEL, in deciding in
favor of the claim, said, "I will first consider what the law is
where there is no special contract between vendor and purchaser
VOL. XXXII.-22
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as to compensation. There are cases in which a purchaser may
lose his right to compensation by doing certain acts which show an
intention on his part to fulfil the contract, and to waive any claim
in respect of misdescription of the property ;" and he cites a passage from Dart's Vendors and Purchasers, stating that a purchaser
may lose his right to resist specific performance, and his right to
compensation by certain conduct on his part, and proceeds:
" No book can be produced to show that it was thought to be
settled law that a purchaser loses his righ.t to compensation by
taking a conveyance, and on what principle should he do so ?
The theory is, that he, has contracted to take compensation, if
there is any variation from the particulars. Why, then, should he
lose it by taking a conveyance? Th6 only reason that can be
alleged is, that everything is supposed to be settled between the
parties, but why should that be an obstacle to the right of the
purchaser when the defect is discovered afterwards ? * * * As to
the authorities, they are. all, with one exception (Manson v.
Thacker, supra,) the other way ;" and he cites Carn v. Cann, 8
Sim. 447, which, he says, was not distinguishable from the case
before him, and Bos v. Relsham, supra, in which the Court of
Exchequer decided in the same way, and he proceeds to say:
" With these auth'orities, one would think the law was settled, but
MALINS, V. C., has, in Hanson v. Thacker, supra, decided the
other way. * * * Considering Cann v. Cann, 8upra, and Bos
v. Helsham, supra, I should consider myself bound by authority,
and I cannot imagine that MALINS, V. C., intended to overrule
the previous cases."
In the still more recent case of Allen v. ?ic1hardson, 18 Ch. D.
524, the same question again arose before MALINS, V. C., and
that learned judge, who was himself a very experienced conveyancer and learned real property lawyer, in adhering to his former
opinion, said : "I can only say that I very much regret that I am
obliged to take an entirely different view from that of a judge who is
entitled to so much respect as the Master of the Rolls. All I
can say is, that I retain strongly my former opinion, and upon that
opinion I shall act until it is overruled. Until I find' it laid
down by the Court of Appeal that a-purchaser is to be allowed to
be lax in the conduct of his business, that he is to be allowed to lie
by carelessly, and discover things after the completion of the purchase which he ought to have discovered before, I shall adhere to
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my own view, because I believe that such a rule would be detrimental to the best interests of persons possessed of property.
* * * I entirely dissent from all that the Master of the Rolls
appears to have said."
In order to test the correctness of these propositions of Sir
GEORGE JESSEL, I turn to the two authorities that he cites, and to
the standard works of Mr. Dart and Lord ST. LEONARDS upon
vendors and purchasers.
In Cann v. Cann, supra, the question arose in an administration
suit. Certain premises had been put up for sale by auction under
an order of the court. The premises were represented by the
vendors, in the particulars, as being then in the occupation of
tenants at a rent of 551. a year. One of the conditions of sale
provided that, if there should appear any error or mistake whatever respecting the estate it should not annul the sale, but a
compensation should be given. Upon the faith of the representation as to the rent one Phipson became the purchaser, the
purchase-money was paid to the credit of the cause and the
estate was conveyed to Phipson. After he was let into possession he discovered that the representation as to rent was false,
as the rent was only 401. a year; he then presented a petition in
the cause praying for compensation out of the fund in court. Now
here was a case in which, in the first place, there was a special
contract for compensation between the parties; and, secondly,
there was a distinct and most material false representation and
actionable fraud by the vendor; and, thirdly, the petition was
presented in relation to a purchase carried out under the order of
the court in an administration suit, the propeeds'of the sale beihg
still in the hands of the court. SHADWELL, V. 0., said: "The
question is whether, there having been a misrepresentation in
respect of which the purchaser had a right of action, the circumstance of his having taken a conveyance has destroyed that right.
The right of the petitioner is not at all affected by that circumstance, and, as the court would not have permitted him to bring
an action for damages on account of the misrepresentation, I
am of opinicon he is entitled to be recouped out of the purchasemoney."
Bos v. Helsham, supra, was an action at law for compensation
under a contract of sale, containing the clause that, if any error
whatever should appear in the particulars of sale, it should not
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annul the sale, but in such case a reasonable compensation should
be given. The defendants pleaded, on equitable grounds, that
they had by deed conveyed the property according to the contract,
to the plaintiff, who accepted the conveyance and paid the purchasemoney, and the purchase was then finally completed, and that after
the completion the plaintiff discovered, and then for the first time
gave notice of, the alleged error. To this there was a demurrer.
KELLY, 0. B., and the Court of Exchequer gave judgment for the
plaintiff, upon the ground that, by the terms of the special contract,
the defendant had agreed to make compensation for any errors in
the particulars, and that there was no limitation of this to errors
discovered before completion, and CIIANNELL, B., bases his judgment solely upon the interpretation of tle express contract between
the parties, considering that it was wholly beside the question to
consider what would have been the rights of the parties in equity.
apart from express agreement. The attention of the learned judges
in that case does not appear-to have been directed to the point that
the compensation clause in such contracts is introduced into the
conditions of sale for the benefit of the vendors, and to protect
them against what would otherwise have been the right of the purchaser in equity to resist specific performance of the contract on
the ground of inconsiderable errors and inaccuracies in the particulars: see lrhittemore v. Whittemore, L. R., 8 Eq. 603. Nor
was their attention called to the point that, so far as such conditions form part of any contract, they are entirely merged in, and
superseded by, the formal deed of conveyance.
In Dart's Vendors and Purchasers, ch. 14, s. 5, the rule is thus
laid down : "With sorae feW special exceptions a purchaser, after
the conveyance is executed by all necessary parties, has no remedy
at law or in equity in respect of defects, either in the title to, or
quantity or quality of,the estate, which are not covered by the
vendor's covenants." And in section 6 he enumerates the special
exceptions in which there is a remedy after conveyance, and these
are all cases either of actual falsehood and fraud on the part of the
vendor entitling the purchaser to a rescission of the contract, or
where there is a total absence of the subject-matter of'the intended
contract, and he expressly says that a "bill filed after conveyance
simply for compensation in respect of defects will be dismissed;"
* and Lord ST. LEONARD'S book is to the same effect.

This is how the modern authorities stand, and I own that, if it
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had not been for the opinions attributed to Sir GEORGE JESSEL
and FRY, L. J., in the cases referred to, I should have thought the
rules applicable to the case tolerably clear. After the best consideration that I am able to give to these, conflicting authorities, I
am of opinion, in the first place, that it has been the established
practice of the Court of Chancery that a bill for compensation,
properly so called, the purchaser retaining the property, could not
be entertained after the completion of the contract and execution
of the conveyance, and that the jurisdiction under which compensation was granted was exercised only as ancillary to specific performance, and was never exercised independently. The evidence
of this is principally negative, but it was distinctly recognised and
stated in the case of Newham v. May, 13 Price 749. In that
case the purchaser of freehold houses filed his bill after conveyance, praying for compensation for the difference in value of the
property by reason of the amount of rent having been misrepresented by the vendor. The bill was dismissed, ALEXANDER, C. B.,
stating it as his opinion that the remedy in such cases was by action
at law for damages, and that the jurisdiction of equity in cases of
compensatioh had grown up only as ancillary to and incidentally
necessary to effectuate decrees of specific performance of contracts
for .the sale of real property.
A similar opinion was expressed by Lord ELDON in Todd v.
aee, 17 Yes. 273, in which he followed the course of earlier
authorities see Gwillim v. Stone, 14 Ves. 128, and Blore v.
Sutton, 3 Mer. 237. This rule seems to me also to rest upon
sound principles of law and equity; because, if it were otherwise,
a purchaser might, after conveyance, and while still insisting upon
retaining the estate, ask for an abatement of the agreed purchasemoney, which would be wholly contrary'to every principle. If he
came before conveyance he might, if misled, even by an innocent
error, fairly say to the vendor, "I have been misled, and do not
wish to have the estate, and if you insist upon my performing the
contract'and taking it, a fair abatement from the price ought to be
made," in which case the vendor would be placed in a fair position,
because if he was unwilling to part with his estate at the reduced
price he might retain it; on the other hand, if the purchaser were
entitled to insist upon retaining the estate, and at the same time
claim an abatement of the price, the result would be that the
vendor, on account of a perfectly innocent and unintentional error,
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might be compelled to part with his estate for a price that he never
had, and never would have, agreed to, which appears to me contrary, not only to the express terms of the contract, but to every
principle both of law and justice. Nor can I reconcile Sir GEORGE
JESSEL'S statement, that "the theory is that the purchaser has
contracted to take compensation if there is any variation from the
particulars," with his assertion that "the purchaser may lose his
right to compensation by showing an intention to fulfil the contract, and waive any claim in respect of misdescription," because
if his right rested upon contract simply, so as not to be affected by
the purchaser completing and taking a conveyance, I am unable to
understand how his intention to fulfil and to waive such claim
could affect his actual rights under the contract. I am further of
opinion, secondly, that after the purchaser has taken a conveyance
and the purchase-money has been paid, no action can be maintained either at law or in equity for damages or compensation on
account of errors as to the quantity or quality of the subject-matter
of the sale, unless such error amount to a breach of some contract
or warranty contained in the conveyance itself, or unless some fraud
I
and deceit has been practised upon the purchaser.
I will now apply these tests to the present case; and, first, was
there any fraud practised upon the purchaser?. And to this I
answer unhesitatingly that there was not. The facts upon which
this point rests are shortly these. Upon the treaty for the sale the
vendor represented the quantity of land as being three acres,
whereas it was only 2a. 1r. 1 2 p., and consequently the representation was untrue in fact. This representation was qualified
afterwards by the language both of the contract and the conveyance, and the county court judge acquits the vendor of fraud.
This, in my opinion, ought to be decisive upon the question in
favor of the vendor, but it was strenuously and ably argued before
us that this positive and untrue representation amounted to and
constituted a legal fraud, which entitled the purchaser to relief.
It was contended that if a man takes upon himself to make a positive representation of fact in order, for his own benefit, to induce
another person to act upon it, and the representation is acted upon,
and it was at the time untrue in fact, that amounts to a fraud;
and it was contended that that was exactly the present case, and
that, notwithstanding the finding of the county court judge
negativing fraud, his decision could be supported, taking the
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admitted facts, upon the ground that there was here legal, if not
moral, fraud:
It cannot be denied that for some years in the history of our
jurisprudence great doubt hung over the question whether, in
order to maintain the common-law action of deceit, i; was necessary
to establish actual moral fraud on the part of the defendant. In
1840 the Court of Exchequer decided, in Cornfoot v. Powke, 6 M.
& W. 358, that an untrue representation, upon the faith of which
an agreement was entered into to take a. furnished house, must, in
order to avoid the agreement, have been not only untrue, but
actually false and fraudulent, on the part of the person making it.
On the other hand, in the year 1842, the Court of Queen's Bench,
in the case of Fuller v. Wilson, 3 Q. B. N. S. 58, entirely dissented from the opinion of the Court of Exchequer, and decided,
in an action brought by a purchaser of a house against the vendor
for misrepresentation as to the house being free from rates and
taxes, that, whether there was moral fraud or not, if the purchaser was actually deceived in his bargain, that was sufficient.
The controversy between the two courts continued for several years,
until the point was decided in the Exchequer Chamber in 1845, in
the case of Ormrod v. Rfuth, 14 M. & W. 651, where it was laid
down that an action of deceit was not maintainable without showing
that the representation was false to the knowledge of the person
making it, or that he acted fraudulently in making it; and this
must be taken now to be the settled and established law. In other
words, ever since 1845, it has been clear and established law that,
in considering the principles governing this class of cases, the
term "fraud" must be used and understood in the common meanirg of the word, as it is ordinarily used in the English language,
and as implying some base conduct and moral turpitude. With
all deference to those who have persistently continued to use the
expression "legal fraud," which, I believe, was first introduced by
Lord KENYON, in 1801, it is certainly a matter of regret that the
expression has ever been introduced into legal language. I adopt,
with regard to that expression, the words of Lord BRATHWELL in
Weir v. Bll, 3 Ex. D. 238, where he says, "I do not understand
legal fraud. To my mind it has no more meaning than legal heat,
legal cold, legal light or legal shade. There never can be a wellfounded complaint of legal fraud except where some duty is
shown and correlative right, and some violation of that duty and
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right. And when these exist it is much better that they should
be stated and acted on than that recourse should be had to a
phrase illogical and unmeaning with the consequent uncertainty."
Armed with this authority of Lord BRAMWELL, I reject the
phrase "legal fraud," as distinguished from "moral fraud and
deceit," as wholly inapplicable and inappropriate to legal discussion, and I simply ask the question in the present case, Do the
facts disclose a case of fraud ? and I reply, unhesitatingly, that
they do not. Perhaps it is scarcely necessary to add that there
can be no doubt that if a man affirms something as a positive fact
concerning which he has no knowledgewhatever, knowing neither
whether it is a fact or not, and does so intending to induce another
person to act upon it as a fact and for his own benefit, regardless
whether the fact is so or not, then that is the strongest possible
evidence of fraud in the plain meaning of the word, because by
the hypothesis he could not have known that to be true as a fact
which he pretended to know, and which he represented to be a
fact. Still, even in such a case as that, the fraudulent element
must be found to exist as a fact, and cannot be adopted as a mere
inference of law. See Taylor v. A8hton, 11. M. & W. 415; Tiom
v. Bigland, 8 Ex. 725; Rex v. Mawbey, 6 T. R. 619, in which
LAWRENCE, J., says: "Where a man swears to a particular fact
without knowing at the time whether the fact be true or false, it is
as much perjury as if he knew the fact to be false ;" and see Haycraft v. Creasy, 2 East 92, where the defendant had said to the
plaintiff that he knew as a fact of his own knowledge that he might
trust a certain person to any amount, and it turned out that that
person was in fact an imposter and without means, and that the
defendant consequently could not in one sense have actually known
what he said to be true, but that being himself duped he believed
it. Lord KENYON left the case to the jury as a case of fraud, not
in the sense which affixes the stain of moral turpitude, but falling
within the definition of legal fraud, and the jury under this direction found a verdict for the plaintiff; but this was afterwards set
aside by the court, on the ground that it was essential tbat the jury
should find that the defendant had acted in bad faith, and malo
animo and fraudulenter.

Perhaps it is also here necessary to guard against the supposition that a class of cases have been here included which come
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under an entirely different principle of law, for instance, cases
where money -may be recovered back where it has been paid under
a mistake of fact, or where there has been a mutual mistake as to
the subject-matter, as in Bingham v.Bingham, 1 Yes. Sen. 126,
where a man purchased his own estate; or where there turns out
to be no subject-matter in existence, as in Hitchcock v. Giddings,
4 Price 135, and Hastie v. Couturier, 9 Ex. 102, and Gompertz
v. Bartlett, 2 E. & B. 849; or where by reason of an innocent
reticence or misrepresentation'of fact in effecting a marine insurance the parties are not ad idem, and there is no contract from
the beginning. All these cases belong to a different branch of
the law, and form no real exception to the principle governing the
present decision.
In support of the proposition that the rule is the same in equity
as at law, after conveyance, I may refer to Wilde v. Gibson, 1 i.
L. 0. 605. In that case Mademoiselle D'Este, afterwards Lady
Wilde, sold certain building lands upon the cliff at Ramsgate to
Mr. Gibson. The lands were described in the treaty for sale as adjoining a certain liberty way belonging to the town of Ramsgate, and
unaffected by any right or liberty of way over them. After the purchase was completed Mr. Gibson discovered that the public way,
called the liberty way, passed through the property at one point,
and that the vendor's mother had executed a deed poll to the authorities of the town acknowledging the right of way, and covenanting to pay 2s. 6d. a year for the privilege of inclosing the portion
of land over which it ran, and to open it whenever required. This
2s. 6d.had been regularly paid down to the date of the sale. Gibson
filed his bill to set aside the conveyance, and KNIGHT BRUCE, V.
C., entirely acquitting Mademoiselle D'Este of personal fraud or
deception in the matter, set aside the conveyance. Upon appeal
to the House of Lords this decree was reversed. Lord OTTENHAM
based his decision upon this, that the plaintiff, Gibson, bad rested
his case in his bill upon personal misrepresentation and fraud, and
upon that had founded his claim for setting aside his completed
purchase, that he had only proved constructive notice, and that
nothing short of positive knowledge could be sufficient for that
purpose. Lord CAMPBELL said: "In the court below the distinction between a bill for carrying into execution an executory
contract and a bill to set aside a conveyance that had been executed, has not been distinctly borne in mind ; with regard to the
VoL. XXXII.-23
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first, if there be misrepresentation or concealment which is material
to the purchaser, a Court of Equity will not compel him to complete the purchase, but where the conveyance has been executed,
* * * a Court of Equity will set aside the conveyance only on
the ground of actual fraud ; and there would be no safety for the
transactions of mankind, if, upon discovery being made, at any
distance of time, of a material fact not disclosed to the purchaser,
of which the vendor had merely constructive notice, a conveyance
which had been executed could be set aside." See, also, the observations of COTTON, L. J., in the recent case of Arkwright v. Newbold, 17 Ch. D. 301 ; and Bree v. .olbeek, Doug. 654; Legge v.
Croker, 1 Ball & Bea. 506 ; Pasley v. Freeman, 2 Sm. L. C., 8th
ed., p. 66, and the authorities there cited.
The only further question remaining is whether there was here
any breach of any contract or warranty contained in the conveyance itself. Now, in answering this question, we must turn to
the conveyance, and there we find the land described as two parcels, each defined in the most particular manner by metes and
bounds and other details, and each "as containing by estimation,
one and a half acres or thereabouts."
It turned out when the lands came to be measured that the two
parcels together amounted only to 2a. Ir. 12 p., and the question
is, does this amount to a breach of warranty as to quantity? It
will be noted that the conveyance does not say, " containing by
admeasurement so and so," but " containing by estimation so and
so or thereabouts." I am not aware that any exact definition has
been judicially given to these words, although there have been
several cases iilustrating their meaning-for example, it has been
held that a discrepancy of five acres out of forty-one was not so
serious as to amount to a breach: Winch v. 1Vinchester, 1 V. &.
B. 375. On the other hand, a difference of 100 acres out of 349
was considered too serious to be covered by the qualifying expression : Portman v. Mill, 2 Russ. 570.
I am not able to extract any principle from these cases, but I
would venture to say that the real question is whether the parcels
had or had not in truth and in fact been estimated to contain the
quantity stated or thereabouts? If the discrepancy were very
small there would be very little difficulty in believing that it might
have been so estimated; if the error was very great the statement
might be rejected as incredible; but still I would venture to say
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that in each case it is a question of fact whether the quantity has
been so estimated or not ; and by this I mean, of course, a real
genuine estimate,* and not a merely illusory one. Now, what is
the evidence upon the point in the present case ? It appears that
the defendant had himself bought the land by the description that
it contained by estimation three acres or thereabouts, that he never
measured it, and that he, in fact, believed it to be three acres ;
that the plaintiff himself saw the land and was content to take it
at the estimated quantity, and believed it to amount to three acres,
and there is nothing, except the bare fact of the error, to show
that this estimate was an irrational, still less an impossible one.
I come to the conclusion upon these facts that the land had been
actually, and in fact, estimated at three acres or thereabouts, and
that the plaintiff, upon whom the onus of proof lay to establish
the contrary, did not do so, and that there was consequently no
breach of any warranty.
I think, therefore, that the judgment of the county court judge
was erroneous, and ought to be reversed, and judgment ought to
be given for the defendant.
Judgment reversed.
The same rule had long ago been
adopted in America. For in Williams
v. Hathaway, 19 Pick. 387 (1837), the
deed described the land by metes and
bounds, and as "containing fifteen
acres," and the consideration was one
entire sum for the tract and not so much
per acre. After the conveyance, the
purchaser measured the tract, and it
"fell short by one acre and fifty-five
rods." Thereupon the purchaser brought
an action of assumpsit against the vendor
to recover back a proportionate part of
the purchase-money. But it was held he
could not recover, although the land in
fact was sold by public auction "for
$5.05 by the acre." Since the deed
merged all prior proposals and stipulations, and by the deed it appeared that
the plaintiff paid a certain sum "for
the whole land described and identified,"
it was held that the deed was conclusive as to the entirety of the sale. It
was also held to make no difference that

the vendor after the sale said (though
not to the purchaser), that "if the land
did not hold out fifteen acres, he would
make it right." For such a pr6mise did
not rest upon any legal consideration,
there being no legal liability to refund in
such cases. The same point had been
also decided in Next York, as early as
1816, in Smith v. Ware, 13 Johns. 257,
in which the deed described the land
as "supposed to contain ninety-three
acres," and the whole consideration was
$419.50. In fact, the lot fell short five
In that case, also, the
or six acres.
vendor had promised to pay for the deficiency, but the court held the purchaser had no redress for any part of the
purchase-money.
It is equally well settled that the purchaser in such cases has no remedy upon
the usual covenants in his deed, when
the boundaries of the tract conveyed are
correctly described, since the description
by boundaries is conclusive, and the ad-

JOLLIFFE v. BAKER.
dition of the quantity is but immaterial
description : 'owell v. Clark, 5 Mass.
355 (1809).
And, it seems, a court of equity will
not ordinarily give relief in such cases
on the ground of mistake, especially
where the words "more or less " are
inserted in the deed. Marein v. Bennett, 8 Paige Cih. 321 (1840), in which
the chancellor said: "Where land is
sold at a eertain price by the 'acre
or foot,' and it turns out that by the
mutual mistake of the parties, there is
considerable deficiency in the quantity,
courts of equity have so far interfered
in some cases as to relieve the purchaser
from the payment for the deficiency.
But even in such cases a slight variation
In quantity will not afford a ground for
the interference of this court to correct
a mistake. And where a lot or farm is
sold 'in gross' or by its boundaries,
and is conveyed by a deed containing
the words 'more or less,' such words
being inserted upon deliberation, as in
this case, because neither party professed
to know the precise quantity contained
within the boundaries of the deed, certainly no court ought to interfere to
make a new contract for the parties
which they did not think proper to make
for themselves, unless upon clear evidence of fraud or intentional misrepresentation."

See, also, Noble v. Googins, 99 Mass.
231 (1868), in which the deed described
the lot as "measuring about two hundred and twenty feet on Borden street,
more or less." In fact, it measured
only one hundred and seventy feet on

that street. In an action for the agreed
price, the purchaser claimed an abatement on account of the deficiency in the
quantity. But he was held liable for
the whole amount, and the doctrine on
this point was thus stated by GRAY, J.:
"It has been declared bya great weight.
of authority, in accordance, as we think,
with the soundest reason, that in an
agreement for the sale and purchase of
land for an entire sum, either a description of the land by its boundaries, or
the insertion of the words ' more or
less,' or equivalent words, will control
a statement of 'the quantity of the land
or of the length of one of the boundary
lines, so that neither party will be entitled to relief on account of a deficiency
or a surplus, unless in case of so great
a difference as will naturally raise the
presumption of fraud or gross mistake
in the very essence of the contract :"
Stebbis v. Eddy, 4 Mason 414; 1 Story
Eq. 144 a, 195 ; 4 Kent Com. (6th ed.)
467 and note; Mfarvin v. Bennett, 8
Paige 321.; 26 Wend. 169; Morris
Canal Co. v. Enmett, 9 Paige 168;
Faurev. Martin, 3 Selden 219 ; Ketchin
v. Stout, 20
io 453; Sttdl v. Hurrt,
9 Gill 446; Weart v. Rose, 1 C. E.
Green 290. On the other hand, if the
variation between the lot described and
that conveyed be very considerable, the
rule may be different. Consult Paine
v. Upton, 87 N. Y. 327 ; Darling v.
Osborne, 51 Vt. 148, two of the modern
cases on this subject, and the cases there
referred to.
EDMUND H. BENNETT.
Boston, Feb. 1st 1884.

